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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Woodrow Grant appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.

He argues that the district court failed to apply the

proper standards when denying him the assistance of post-conviction counsel and
summarily dismissing his petition.

He contends further that he made sufficient

allegations of fact in his verified pleadings to merit both assistance of counsel and an
evidentiary hearing on his claims. Based on either argument, he requests this Court
vacate the district court's orders and remand the case for further proceedings with the
instruction that he be appointed post-conviction counsel and afforded an evidentiary
hearing as part of those further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Grant was incarcerated on three different charges in three separate cases
(aggravated

battery,

possession

of methamphetamine,

and

domestic assault).

(R., pp.1-2.) He timely petitioned for post-conviction relief in those cases. 1 He alleged
that his attorney had been deficient in multiple aspects of his representation at the trial
level. (R., pp.2-4.) Mr. Grant set forth the facts supporting his allegations in his petition,
as well as an attached affidavit in support. (R., pp.2-7.) In addition, he filed a motion
and affidavit in support of appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-11.) Both
of these documents were verified by a notary public. (R., p.7.) The record does not

In regard to the aggravated battery charge, Mr. Grant had originally been placed on
probation following a successful period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.1.) That probation
was subsequently revoked. (R., p.1.) Therefore, in regard to that case, his petition for
post-conviction relief is only timely from the order revoking probation.
1

1

indicate that the State ever filed an answer or motion for summary dismissal. 2 (See

generally R.; see also Register of Actions (RoAs)i
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition.
(R., pp.23-49.) In that notice, it also denied Mr. Grant's request for the assistance of
post-conviction counsel because, it asserted, he did not allege facts raising the
possibility of a valid claim. (R., p.27.) It then articulated its reasons for dismissing his
various claims. (R., pp.28-49.) The most prevalent of its rationales was that Mr. Grant
had not presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which the district court
described as conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.31, 37, 38, 39,41,
43, 44, 46, 47, 48.) It also reasoned that Mr. Grant had not proven his allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or adequate facts to
state a claim for relief. 4 (R., pp.37, 39, 40, 41, 48.) Along those same lines, the district
court indicated that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated the outcome
of his case would be different in order to survive summary dismissal. (R., pp.46-47.)
Mr. Grant filed a motion to amend the petition and a response to the district
court's notice of intent to dismiss.

(R., pp.50-60.)

verified by a notary public. (R., p.60.)
supported his various claims.

As before, his assertions were

He alleged additional, more-specific facts that

(R., pp.52-60.)

Mr. Grant was making two overarching arguments.

Those clarifications revealed that
First, he contended that his trial

attorney had provided deficient and prejudicial performance in several ways:

by not

The State did file a motion to extend the time for filing an answer, which the district
court granted. (R., pp.19-22.)
3 The RoAs appear before the first numbered page in the Clerk's Record.
4 As a result of this perspective, the district court apparently did not regard the facts
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings and affidavit as evidence that it could
consider, or, at least, did not accept the factual allegations as true. (See generally,
R., pp.23-49.)
2

2

moving for a change of venue or the district court judge's recusal; not presenting
mitigating evidence concerning the impact of his mental condition or testimony
regarding the improper investigation of the underlying cases; not informing him of his
rights, as articulated in Estrada

5

;

and, not allowing him an opportunity to review the

Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) or assisting him to object to
improperly-included information therein. (R., pp.52-59.)
Second, as to the two cases in which his petition was timely from the judgments,
Mr. Grant contended that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter his guilty
pleas because of his attorney's improper assurances that he would receive concurrent
sentences and the opportunity to participate in the rider program; and, because he was
incompetent at the time he entered the plea due to a severe depressive episode caused
by his bi-polar disorder. (R., pp.56-58.) Along with his response to the notice of intent
to dismiss, Mr. Grant also renewed his request for appointment of post-conviction
counsel. (R., p.59.) As part of that request he asserted that, in addition to the facts he
had already alleged to be true, there was evidence he was unable to collect or present
to the district court due to his incarceration, but which he claimed would provide
additional support for his allegations. (See R., p.59.)
Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction
relief. It asserted that Mr. Grant's response to the notice of intent to Dismiss "did not
include any additional documents or affidavits." (R., p.86.) Again, as it went through
Mr. Grant's specific allegations, the district court reasoned that he had not presented
any evidence other than his own allegations, which it still considered to be conclusory,
unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.86, 90, 92,95,96,98,100,101,102,103,

5

Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006).

3

104, 105, 106.) It also continued to assert that Mr. Grant had not proven his allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or adequate facts
to state a claim for relief. (R., pp.98, 100, 104.) Additionally, it continued to assert that
Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated "the outcome of his case would
have been different" in order to survive summary dismissal.

(R., p.106; see also

R., pp.95, 96.) It also denied Mr. Grant's renewed motion for post-conviction counsel
for the same reason it had before. (R., p.90.)
Mr. Grant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing
his petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b). (R., pp.65-85l Again, the document
was verified by a notary public. (R., p.85.) In that motion, Mr. Grant alleged additional
facts which supported several of his claims. (See R., pp.69-84.) Three months later,
the district court determined that Mr. Grant had simply reiterated his prior allegations
and that he did not argue that the district court had made any errors of law or fact in its
initial decision, and so, it denied that motion. (R., p.115.) Mr. Grant filed a notice of
appeal which is timely as to all the district court's decisions. 7

This document appears in the record out of chronological order. It was file-stamped
May 27, 2011. (R., p.65.) The district court's order dismissing the petition for postconviction relief, which appears subsequently in the record, was file-stamped on
May 11,2011. (R., p.86.)
7 The final judgment dismissing Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief conforming
with the requirements from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on
June 13,2013, in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's order on that same date.
I.A.R. 17(e)(2) allows that a notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an appealable
order will become valid upon the filing of the appealable judgment. Weller v. State, 146
Idaho 652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Mr. Grant's appeal is timely from the
final judgment.
Additionally, Mr. Grant's notice of appeal is timely from the order denying his
motion to reconsider filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) because the time to appeal begins
anew when the district court enters such an order. First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho
598,603 (1977).
6

4

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred when it declined to appoint counsel in Mr. Grant's
post-conviction action, even though he had made the necessary showing to merit
appointment of counsel.

2.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Grant's petition
for post-conviction relief without properly considering the undisputed factual
allegations he made in his verified petition and affidavit in support of that petition.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Declined To Appoint Counsel In Mr. Grant's PostConviction Action, Even Though He Had Made The Necessary Showing To Merit
Appointment Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
Mr, Grant made the necessary showing to require appointment of counsel as he

alleged facts supporting some of the elements of his claims for relief. As such, the
district court should have appointed counsel to assist him in making a full and complete
presentation of evidence to the district court in support of those claims.

In light of a

recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, this failure to appoint counsel
when merited violated Mr. Grant's constitutional right to due process since the postconviction action was Mr. Grant's first opportunity to present these issues, particularly
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The question of whether there is such a
due process right has yet to be decided by the United States Supreme Court, and the
Idaho precedent to the contrary should be reexamined in light of the new United States
Supreme Court precedent. 8
However, even if no such right is recognized, Mr. Grant still has an Idaho
statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings since he alleged facts that
could possibly give rise to a valid claim for relief. Therefore, under either rationale, the
district court erroneously denied Mr. Grant's numerous requests for the assistance of
post-conviction counsel. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's order
denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the order summarily

8 E.g., Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 724 (1998) (,'There is no statutory or legal right
to an attorney in post-conviction proceedings in Idaho.") (citing Banks v. State, 128
Idaho 886, 889 (1996) and Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1995».

6

dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings with the
assistance of counsel.

B.

Mr. Grant Had A Due Process Right To An Attorney In The Initial Post-Conviction
Proceedings Under The State And Federal Constitutions
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a

right to counsel

in certain

situations. 9

U.S. CONST. amend

XIV;

see,

e.g.,

Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 195 (1957) ("Where the right to counsel is of such
critical importance as to be an element of Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a finding of waiver is not lightly to be made."); In Interest of Kinley, 108
Idaho 862, 866 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The right to counsel is so basic to our notions of fair
trial and due process that denial of the right is never treated as harmless error.");
Pierce v. State, 2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 24, 1 (Ct. App. March 25, 2004)
(recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment protections include a guarantee of
counsel, noting that the Idaho Supreme Court has yet to decide whether that right
extends to "discretionary review after an appeal"); 10 see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 401 (1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the

The Idaho Constitution should also afford this right as part of the due process rights
afforded by Art. /, § 13, as the two clauses are substantially the same. Compare
U.S. CONST. amend XIV with IDAHO CONST. art I, § 13. Although Idaho reserves the
right to interpret its constitution as more protective than its federal counterpart, it will
consider the federal jurisprudence when interpreting the provisions thereof.
Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 (1996); State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 190
9

~2000).

o As an unpublished opinion, Pierce has no authoritative or precedential value. Internal
Rules of the Idaho Supreme Court, Rule 15(f). It is cited merely as an example of the
analysis the Court of Appeals has used when reviewing the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process right to counsel in regard to discretionary review after direct appeal, such
as post-conviction petitions in Idaho.
7

Constitution-and,

in

particular,

in

accord

with

the

Due

Process

Clause.");

Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[Flailing to provide a post-

conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented
may be violative of due process.").
The "initial-review collateral proceeding" (in post-conviction cases, the initial
petition heard by the district court) is one such proceeding where deprivation of the
assistance of counsel constitutes a deprivation of due process, See Martinez v. Ryan,
132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) ("[T]he Constitution may require the States to provide
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because 'in [these] cases . . . state
collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction."')
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991)). This is because the initialreview collateral proceeding serves as the applicant's only chance to challenge the
effectiveness of his attorney.11

Id.

As a result of this aspect of the initial-review

11 The States have been permitted to establish their own systems in regard to direct
appeals and collateral attacks. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. Idaho has chosen
to separate the collateral attack from the direct appeal because the direct appeal record
may not contain sufficient evidence to effectively resolve the collateral claims. See,
e.g., State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho
437, 443 (2008). Idaho's system requires that an applicant, who is seeking to challenge
his sentence with evidence not in the direct appeal record (i.e., to support an ineffective
assistance claim), should make that claim in post-conviction because "[ilf an appellate
court were to reach the merits of ineffective assistance issues raised on direct appeal,
the absence of any record supporting the claims would generally require a decision
adverse to the appellant, which would be res judicata." Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549;
accord Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443.
The United States Supreme Court explained that such a system is not only
permissible, but is based on sound reasoning. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. But the
Supreme Court also pointed out that such a system has consequences for the state
implementing it. Id. For instance, employing such a system reduces the State's ability
to foreclose claims through procedural bars. See id. As such, the Coleman Court's
rationale, that the Constitution may require the States to provide counsel in certain
collateral attacks to a conviction, would apply to not only the initial proceedings on the
direct appeal, but the initial-review collateral proceeding created in Idaho's postconviction system as well. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315,1317.

8

collateral proceeding, those proceedings may constitute an exception from the holdings
in Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989), which, according to the Court in Coleman, established a general rule that there
is no right to counsel in such collateral proceedings. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that this question remains unresolved:
[Coleman] left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a
question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective
counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. ... Coleman had suggested,
though without holding, that the Constitution may require States to provide
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because "in [these]
cases, ... state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a
challenge to his conviction." As Coleman noted, this makes the initialreview collateral proceeding a prisoner's "one and only appeal" as to an
ineffective-assistance claim, and this may justify an exception to the
constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral
proceedings. This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that
exception exists as a constitutional matter.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755).

The reason the United States Supreme Court did not completely resolve that
question is simple: that particular question was not presented on appeal. Martinez,
132 S. Ct. at 1315. Rather, the question before the Court in that case was whether
ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding may provide cause for
a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding. Id. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
had determined that the applicant did not have a right to counsel in the initial-review
collateral proceeding, and thus, his initial post-conviction attorney's failure to raise
the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel did not prevent a procedural default of
the habeas proceedings because that claim had not been raised in the initial postconviction proceeding. Id. at 1313-15. The United States Supreme Court reversed that
decision and remanded for a determination on the substantive issues raised: whether

9

Mr. Martinez's initial-review collateral proceeding counsel had been ineffective and
whether his underlying claim (ineffective assistance of trial counsel) was substantial. Id.
at 1320-21.
The Supreme Court explained that during such a "first-tier" proceeding, pro se
petitioners "'are generally ill equipped to represent themselves because they do not
have a brief from counselor an opinion of the court addressing their claim of error.'" Id.
at 1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)). The Supreme Court
pointed out that "[w]here . . . the initial-review collateral proceeding is the first
designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,
the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as
to the ineffective-assistance claim."12 Id. As such, "[w]ithout the help of an adequate
attorney, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim."

Id.

Therefore, counsel needs to be appointed in

such situations. See id.
The Supreme Court also recognized that "[c]laims of ineffective assistance at trial
often require investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy," implying that
applicants for post-conviction relief often could not engage in that necessary

12 This language is particularly applicable to Idaho. In Idaho, post-conviction is
undisputedly the first designated proceeding for the applicant to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549; Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443;
see also Trevino v. Thaler, 113 S. Ct. 1911 (May 28, 2013) (clarifying that where the
procedures set up by the state, while not requiring claims of ineffective assistance to be
made in post-conviction, would make it "highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant
will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trail
counsel on direct appeal, our holding in Martinez applies" and the post-conviction is
considered the first designated proceeding to raise ineffective assistance of counsel
claims). Therefore, it is the equivalent of his direct appeal in that regard, and therefore,
the pro se applicant needs the assistance of counsel to effectively prosecute his claims.
See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1311-12.
10

investigation, but appointed counsel could.13 Id. The Supreme Court even addressed
this issue in terms of the system that Idaho employs for resolving ineffective assistance
claims:
When the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] cannot be raised on
direct review, . . . a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot rely on a
court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim. To
present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the
State's procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney.

Id. (internal citations omitted; emphasis added); Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619.

Based on

all this language, it appears as though, given the chance, the United States Supreme
Court will hold that, during the initial-review collateral proceeding, particularly if it is
separate from the direct appeal, the applicant has a right to the assistance of counsel. 14

See id. at 1315-17.
However, the Supreme Court did express some concerns with making a ruling as
to a potential constitutional right in this regard: doing so would deprive the states of the
flexibility they currently enjoy in addressing post-conviction claims. See id. at 1319-20.
Therefore, the Court gave the States the chance to "elect between appointing counsel in
initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a

13 Mr. Grant specifically alleged that this was so in his case: "Because of [Mr.] Grant's
status as an incarcerated individual, it is almost impossible for him to present evidence
[as the district court is requiring]." (R., p.59.) Specifically, Mr. Grant asserted that he "I.
[Is f]airly ignorant of the law and evidentiary requirements[;] II. Cannot go and collect
paperwork and testimony in person[;] III. Is unsure of what evidence this Court would
consider important and pertinent[;] IV. And is unable to properly write up a response that
is adequate and up to the high standards this Court is accustomed to." (R., p.59.) As
such, according to the United States Supreme Court, he "likely needs an effective
attorney." Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added).
14 In fact, in his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that the practical effect of the
Martinez ruling and actually establishing a constitutional rule requiring appointment of
counsel in collateral-review proceedings is, for all intents and purposes, the same.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321-22, 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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defense on the merits in [such] proceedings."
concluded:

Id. at 1320.

The Supreme Court

"Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar
a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial
if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counselor counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective."

Id. at 1320.

Therefore, Idaho's choice is to provide

effective counsel in the initial-review collateral proceedings and allow its courts to
decide these cases based on Idaho law, or to continue procedurally barring such claims
and cede the authority to decide the merits of claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel to the federal courtS. 15 See id at 1319-20.
As such, Idaho should recognize the wisdom inherent in the Martinez ruling: that
in order to efficiently resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims, counsel needs to
be appointed in the initial-review proceedings as part of the constitutional guarantees of
due process. Because Idaho has separated such proceedings from the direct appeal
process, that means counsel needs to be appointed for the initial proceedings before
the district court.

Therefore, this Court should recognize the existence of the right,

under either the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. As
such, the denial of post-conviction counsel during the initial-review collateral proceeding
followed by the subsequent procedural bar of his claims - namely summary dismissal
for the alleged failure to articulate sufficient facts to support the claims for relief (see
R., pp.86-107) - means that the district court violated Mr. Grant's constitutional rights in

15 In a special concurrence, Judge Burnett pointed out that Idaho, through the PostConviction Procedure Act, had sought to avoid outside interference from the federal
courts on these issues. Melligner v. State, 113 Idaho 31,35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett,
J., specially concurring).
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this regard.

See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315-21.

Thus, because the district court

violated Mr. Grant's right to due process in this manner, this Court should vacate the
district court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the
order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings
with the assistance of counsel.

C.

Alternatively, Mr. Grant Has A Statutory Right To Post-Conviction Counsel Under
The Facts Of This Case, And Mr. Grant's Allegations Met The Statutory Standard
For Appointment Of Counsel
Should this Court decide that there is no constitutional right to post-conviction

counsel in Idaho, see, e.g., Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 (relying on Finley, 481 U.S. 551
for the assertion that "there is no Sixth Amendment Right to counsel in a collateral
attack upon a conviction"), it should still vacate the district court's decisions to deny
Mr. Grant the assistance of post-conviction counsel and remand for further proceedings.
Idaho law permits appointment of post-conviction counsel if the petitioner demonstrates
the potential of a valid post-conviction claim. I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau I). Therefore, since Mr. Grant has
demonstrated the potential of a valid post-conviction claim, this Court should vacate the
district court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the
order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings
with the assistance of counsel.
An applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to appointment of counsel if he
"alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654 (2007); see also Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. Mr. Grant's assertions of facts in
his verified pleadings and affidavits meet that standard. (See R., pp.1-8, 50-64.) As
those allegations were verified, in that the documents in which they appear were
13

notarized, they constitute evidentiary facts which may be considered by the district court
in support of the applicant's petition for relief.

Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593

(Ct. App. 1993); Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005).

Along with his initial petition, Mr. Grant included his motion for appointment of
counsel and the accompanying affidavit in support of the motion. (R., pp.10-11.) He
renewed that request in his amended pleadings, informing the district court that he
required the assistance of counsel to collect the necessary additional evidence to
prove his allegations and present it in the form to which the district court was
accustomed. (R., p.59.) Under the current standard, Mr. Grant only needed to allege
facts that show "the possibility of a valid claim" in order to merit the appointment of
counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654 (emphasis added); Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
The elements of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are two-fold:
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable (i.e., deficient); and there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for those errors
(i.e., prejudice).
Idaho at 561.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Estrada, 143
For each of his claims (which will be discussed in detail infra), Mr. Grant

alleged facts which show at least the possibility of a valid claim, in that his assertions of
fact support at least one, if not both of the elements under Strickland. (See R., pp.1-8,
50-64.) Therefore, he should have had counsel appointed during the post-conviction
proceedings. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
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1.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing
To Advise Him Of His Right To Remain Silent During The Psychological
Evaluation Per The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada

The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that counsel's performance is
objectively insufficient if it fails to include informing a defendant of his right to remain
silent during a presentence psychological evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. This
privilege is well-established in precedent and applies in regard to all psychological
evaluations

occurring

before

sentencing

or

earlier

in

the

judicial

process.

Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46 (2009); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 (1989).

This is because, unlike a routine presentence investigation, which relies heavily on
information already available through public records, a psychological evaluation delves
into more personal areas of the defendant's life, and thereby, presents a greater risk
that he might make an incriminating statement during that evaluation.

Estrada, 143

Idaho at 562. Therefore, if counsel failed to inform Mr. Grant of his right to remain silent
during the

psychological

evaluations conducted

prior to

his sentencing,

that

performance was deficient. Id. at 564.
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings that his attorney did not advise him
about his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as a part of
the presentence investigation. (R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information
obtained during this interview was used against him at his sentencing hearing.
(R., p.54.)

As part of his verified pleadings, it constitutes evidence that the district

court could consider. Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, Mr. Grant alleged facts which
demonstrate a possibly valid claim that his attorney's performance was deficient in this
regard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, because he
alleged facts which show the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, counsel should
15

have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. See Swader,
143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
The district court impliedly took judicial notice of a guilty plea questionnaire filled
out by Mr. Grant.

(R., p.98 (citing "Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho Criminal

Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010, 2,,).16 Mr. Grant's answers in those questionnaires do
not, however, justify the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant post-conviction
counsel. All Mr. Grant had to do was present facts which showed the possibility of a
valid claim. Estrada makes it clear that defense counsel is required to consult with his
client as to the right to remain silent. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. Therefore, Mr. Grant's
verified allegation that his attorney did not consult with him about these rights raised the

possibility of a valid claim, and therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the
district court's decision to the contrary is erroneous.

Swader, 143 Idaho at 654;

Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
And while the questionnaire does remind the defendant that he still retains some
right to remain silent (see Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.2), that reminder
does not relieve defense counsel of the obligation to consult with the defendant about
those rights. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. In fact, if the district court's perspective
were correct and the guilty plea questionnaire satisfactorily informed the defendant of
the specific rights protected by Estrada, it would render the Estrada decision pointless,
as defense attorneys could simply rely on that questionnaire to fulfill their obligation to
their client. As such, it would significantly erode the protections afforded against self-

16 Mr. Grant filled out separate questionnaires in CR-2009-19445-FE and CR-19451,
both of which bear the date "April 22, 2010." However, as they contain the same
information as they relate to the claims on post-conviction, Mr. Grant has filed a motion
requesting this Court take judicia! notice of both questionnaires contemporaneously with
this brief.
16

incrimination during the presentence phase of the judicial process.

Therefore, the

information in the form guilty plea questionnaire does not disprove the facts alleged by
Mr. Grant. The decision to deny him an attorney is thus, still erroneous. Swader, 143
Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
Furthermore, Estrada dealt with a very specific matter - whether the defendant
was advised by counsel as to his right to remain silent during psychological evaluations.
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562.
investigations, however.

That protection does not extend to normal presentence

See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 461 (Ct. App.

2009) (explaining the distinction the Estrada Court drew in this regard). As such, the
generic assertion that the defendant may retain his right to remain silent in unspecified
future proceedings contained in the form questionnaire to which the district court
referred does not actually provide the protection necessary under Estrada.

Swader,

143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
In fact, the questionnaire that Mr. Grant filled out has a very specific question in
regard to Estrada: "Has your attorney advised you that you have a constitutional right
not to submit to a court ordered psychosexual evaluation for purposes of sentencing?"
(Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.6 (emphasis added).)

Mr. Grant was not

being required to submit to a psychosexual examination, nor had he been charged with
a crime that would even raise the question of whether a psychosexual examination was
required. (See Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.1 (the two questionnaires
indicated that they were related to charges for possession of methamphetamine and
domestic battery).)

Pursuant to the concept of expressio unius est exlusio alterius,

the use of this particular item excludes other, though-similar, items from inclusion in the
statement.

See St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho
17

479,487 (2009); State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 165-66 (Ct. App. 1995) (pursuant to
this concept, statute listing potential victims under the restitution framework did not
include parties not specifically named in the list).

Therefore, all the guilty plea

questionnaire actually informed Mr. Grant of, in regard to Estrada, was that he did not
have to participate in a psychosexual evaluation; it did not provide him with information
regarding his constitutional rights regarding participation in a psychological evaluation,
which is different from a psychosexual evaluation. Compare I.C. § 19-2524 (identifying
and authorizing psychological evaluations) with I.C. § 18-8316 (identifying and
authorizing psychosexual evaluations). Therefore, even if the guilty plea questionnaire
is properly considered, it does not contradict Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to consult with him regarding his right to remain silent during a
psychological evaluation. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562

However, even if that distinction is disregarded, the questionnaires still do not
actually disprove Mr. Grant's allegation that his attorney failed to advise him pursuant to
Estrada. As a practical matter, there is no reason for counsel to fully advise his client

about the right to remain silent during a court-ordered psychological evaluation until
after the district court actually orders such an evaluation.

Counsel may be able to

guess whether the district court is likely to order such an evaluation, but until it is
ordered, counsel will not be fully informed of the situation (whether there will be an
evaluation, who will conduct it, etc.). As such, until the evaluation is actually ordered,
counsel will be unable to fully advise his client as to whether or not the client should
invoke his rights at the court-ordered hearing. U[TJhe decision to be made regarding the
proposed psychiatric evaluation is 'literally a life or death matter' and is 'difficult ... even
for an attorney' because it requires 'a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of
18

the particular psychiatrist's biases and predilections, and of possible alternative
strategies at the sentencing hearing.'"

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981)

(quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis added).17 As
the United States Supreme Court pointed out, counsel's advice in this regard hinges, in
part, on counsel knowing who will perform the evaluation, which is a fact that will not be
known until the district court orders the evaluation be performed. Since the district court
does not order such an evaluation until after the plea is entered and accepted, counsel's
Estrada obligation cannot practically be fulfilled before the entry of plea. Therefore, the
answers to the guilty plea questionnaire cannot conclusively disprove Mr. Grant's claim
that his attorney did not meet his obligation under Estrada. Counsel had the opportunity
after the plea was entered and after Mr. Grant indicated that he was pleased with
counsel's performance to fail to meet his obligation under Estrada. It would be at that
point that Mr. Grant would become displeased with counsel's ineffective performance.
As such, the answers in his guilty plea questionnaire and his allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel in this regard are not mutually exclusive.
Rather, Mr. Grant would not have known, nor would he have had a reason to
know, that his attorney's performance had been deficient until after he filled out the
guilty plea questionnaire and entered his plea of guilty. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has articulated this concept best:
While a defendant's representations [during the entry of a guilty plea]
constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent proceeding, that barrier
is not insurmountable. A defendant's statements at the guilty plea hearing
concerning his relationship with counsel must be evaluated in light of what
the defendant knew or should have known and do not necessarily
preclude him from subsequently raising issues of ineffective assistance.

17 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[t]he analsyis in Estelle [] is instructive."
Estrada 143 Idaho at 562.
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Johnson v. Commonwealth, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003 WL 1786719, *6 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted).18 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
also addressed similar situations and decided that the sequence of events in such
claims is important, determining that the petitioners' challenges to the voluntariness of
their pleas could not be supported by allegations that counsel had performed deficiently
after the plea was entered. United States v. Kerns, 53 Fed.Appx. 863, 865-66 (10th Gir.
2002); United States v. Ellis, 132 Fed.Apps. 209, 211 (10th Gir. 2005); United
States v. Lamson, 132 Fed.Appx. 213, 215 (10th Gir. 2005). Therefore, since Mr. Grant
could not have known or complained of the deficient performance at the guilty plea
hearing, the district court's use of the guilty plea questionnaire against this claim (see
R., p.99) was erroneous. Accordingly, Mr. Grant has alleged facts demonstrating the
possibility of a valid claim (which is true even if the answers to the guilty plea
questionnaire are taken into consideration), and therefore, should have been appointed
counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
As an additional result, even if the guilty plea questionnaire does tend to disprove
Mr. Grant's allegations, denying Mr. Grant assistance of counsel was still inappropriate.
The conflict between the questionnaire and the allegations would only create a genuine
issue of material fact (whether or not sufficient consultation was given in regard to
Mr. Grant's Estrada rights before the psychological examination was conducted). As
such, there was still the potential that counsel could have assisted Mr. Grant to perfect

18 In Kentucky, unpublished appellate decisions entered after January 1, 2003, are not
binding precedent, but "may be cited for consideration by the court if there is no
published decision that would adequately address the issue before the court," provided
a copy of the entire unpublished decision is provided to the court and counsel. KY ST
RGP Rule 76.28(4)(c). Therefore, as there does not appear to be a published opinion
on this point, the decision in Johnson v. Commonwealth is appended to this brief.
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that claim and overcome the implications to the contrary, if any, in the guilty plea
questionnaire. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant the assistance
of counsel was erroneous because nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Grant has
failed to allege facts which revealed a possible valid claim for post-conviction relief.
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793.

2.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Present A Possible Valid Claim That His
Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Reviewing The PSI With
Mr. Grant Or Assisting Him To Object To Erroneous Or Unreliable
Information Contained In The PSI

The information included in PSis must be reliable; otherwise, it is inappropriate
for the district court to consider it at sentencing.

I.C.R. Rule 32(e)(1).

Information

included in a PSI may be presumed reliable if the defendant is afforded an opportunity
to challenge, explain, or rebut that information. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 263
(1998).

Mr. Grant alleged in his response to the district court's notice of intent to

dismiss his claim that he had been deprived of that opportunity because his attomey
had failed to review the PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneouslyincluded or otherwise unreliable information contained therein.

(R., p.56.)

Such a

failure is objectively unreasonable performance by an attorney, particularly because
erroneously-included or unreliable information in a PSI can haunt a defendant in
numerous future proceedings. See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1. As a result, those
allegations also demonstrate the prejudice of counsel's ineffective performance. See id.
Therefore, since the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged presented a
possible valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error.
Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793.
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Swader, 143 Idaho at 654;

3.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Valid Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel That His Attorney Provided Ineffective
Assistance By Not Presenting Certain Mitigating Evidence

In regard to Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by
not presenting certain mitigating evidence, the district court properly noted in its notice
of intent to dismiss that Mr. Grant had not identified what mitigating evidence his
attorney had purportedly failed to present, and so he had not sufficiently supported his
claim. (R, pp.38-39.)
However, in his response to that notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant did identify
the evidence to which he was referring. (R., pp.52-53, 56-59.) Specifically, he alleged
that there were two witnesses, one of whom would have contradicted the victim's
version of events and who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the
investigation, and another who would have testified that the police had "'lost' testimony"
or other evidence that should have been presented to the district court. (R, pp.58-59.)
In addition, he explained that there were several mental health examination reports
which would demonstrate that he should have been considered for mental health court,
or that would otherwise have provided the district court with a more complete
perspective of his mental health issues. 19 (R, pp.52-53, 56-57.) Strongly implied in
these assertions is that, had the district court been presented with this evidence,
Mr. Grant would have received a more lenient sentence.

(See R, pp.52-53, 56-59.)

19 In a clear demonstration of the Catch-22 to which the district court subjected
Mr. Grant in regard to sufficiently articulating his claims, it found that he had presented
no evidence to support his own allegations as to whether he might have been accepted
into the mental health court program (R, p.96), but would not give him counsel to help
investigate the viability of that claim by obtaining the necessary evidence (which
Mr. Grant alleged existed, but was unattainable by him due to his incarceration).
(See, e.g., R, p.53.) In essence, the district court required him to provide it with
evidence that it was not possible for him to get

22

Regardless, because the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged demonstrate the
possibility of a valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error.

Swader, 143 Idaho at 654;

Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793.

Furthermore, as discussed in Section I(C)(1), supra, the idea that Mr. Grant's
answers on the guilty plea questionnaire conclusively disprove these allegations is
illogical, since the actions which are alleged deficient occurred at the sentencing
hearing. (See R., pp.58-59.) As such, any information in the answers to the guilty plea
questionnaire is irrelevant to this claim. See Johnson, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003
WL 1786719, *6.

Mr. Grant could not have known or complained of the deficient

performance at the guilty plea hearing, and thus, the district court's use of the guilty plea
questionnaire against this claim (see R., p.99) was erroneous. Since Mr. Grant alleged
facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, the district court erred
by not appointing him an attorney. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho
at 793.

4.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To
Move For A Change Of Venue Or Disqualification Of The Presiding Judge

Mr. Grant asserted that his attorney should have moved for a change of venue or
to disqualify the presiding judge because of specific prejudicial circumstances.

For

example, Mr. Grant alleged that that the victim's mother may have been able to
influence the investigation based on her position within the police department and that

23

the presiding judge may have had a bias against Mr. Grant based upon the judge's
representation of Mr. Grant's brother. 2o (See R., p.52)
The district court dismissed that claim because it determined that decision was a
tactical decision left to the discretion of trial counsel and, according to the district court,
there was no evidence in the record which would establish the basis for such a claim.
(R., pp.35-36.) To support its decision, the district court cited State v. Carter, 103 Idaho
917, 923 (1982) (hereinafter, Carter I). The decision in Carter I was vacated when a
new trial was granted pursuant to a successful post-conviction action.

See

Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985) (hereinafter, Carter II). The Supreme Court held,
in regard to the decision to pursue a change of venue in post-conviction, that the critical
aspect of its determination on the direct appeal (Carter I) was that it informed Mr. Carter
that the proper forum to challenge such a decision by his attorney was in postconviction, where he could present new evidence that was simply not available in the
direct appeal record. Carter/I, 108 Idaho at 792. The Court stated: "However, and of
crucial importance to the present proceeding, we went on to state that, 'If evidence to
the contrary is available outside the record, it may be presented only by way of a
petition for post-conviction relief . . . . '"

Id.

As Mr. Carter proceeded to follow that

instruction, barring the challenge in light of that additional evidence, would be improper.

Id.

Therefore, if Mr. Grant had evidence with which to supplement the record and

20 The district court cited to Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333 (Ct. App. 1998), to
support its actions in this regard. (R., p.36.) In that case, however, the applicant failed
to point to any specific evidence "which might reveal the district court's bias." Small,
132 Idaho at 333. Thus, there was no evidence which would demonstrate that the
attorney had been objectively unreasonable by not requesting the judge's recusal. See
id. In this case, however, Mr. Grant has pointed to specific evidence which might reveal
bias on the part of the district court, and so, Mr. Grant should have at least had the aid
of an attorney to fully investigate and prosecute that argument in post-conviction. See
Martinez, 132 U.S. at 1317; Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
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demonstrate the inadequacy of counsel's consideration of the question of venue, that is
a viable issue on post-conviction. See id.
Mr. Grant alleged facts that cause serious pause in regard to his trial attorney's
decision to not pursue a change of venue. (See R., p.52) If true, they establish the
objective unreasonableness of Mr. Grant's attorney's decision to not request a change
of venue.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Carter /I, 108 Idaho at 792.

Those

allegations also imply the argument that the decision to not challenge venue caused
prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral magistrate. 21
Therefore, because Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate the possibility of a valid
claim, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was
in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.

5.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Inducing His
Guilty Plea With The Assurance That Jurisdiction Would Be Retained
While He Participated In The Rider Program

If an attorney provides his client with advice which goes beyond the range of
competence demanded of attorneys during the plea process, that advice may deprive
the plea of the requisite voluntariness. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884 (Ct. App.
2008).

To prove prejudice, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability

Mr. Grant recognizes that, usually, the decision of whether or not to request a change
of venue is a tactical decision that will not be reviewed in post-conviction. See, e.g.,
State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993). However, Carter /I still provides that
challenges to such decisions are appropriately raised in post-conviction and, with
sufficient evidence, may be viable. Carter II, 108 Idaho at 792 (quoting Carter I, 103
Idaho at 923) (holding that "the alleged deficiencies fell into the area of strategic and
tactical choices and that the record was 'devoid of any indication that such choices were
a result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of counsel. ... Absent such evidence'
we held 'it must be presumed that defense counsel's actions were not [ineffective]")
(emphasis added).
21
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that, absent the deficient advice, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.

Id.

Initially, Mr. Grant failed to articulate the "false assurances" which would demonstrate
the deficient advice he claimed occurred. (R., pp.7, 44-45.) However, in his response
to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, he clarified his claim, alleging that his
attorney told him the district court had agreed in a meeting in chambers to impose
concurrent sentences that would not exceed a unified term of ten years with four years
fixed, and also that trial counsel also told him he could expect a period of retained
jurisdiction. (R., p.57.) Mr. Grant also stated in his verified amended pleadings that, but
for those assurances, there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on
proceeding to trial.

(R., p.58.)

If true, those allegations present at least a genuine

issue of material fact as to the objective unreasonableness of that advice, as well as the
prejudice arising from that erroneous advice. Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884.
As such, the verified and unrefuted facts alleged by Mr. Grant demonstrate a
possible viable claim for relief. Therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the
decision to deny him counsel was in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I,
140 Idaho at 793.

6.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Viable Claim That
He Was Incompetent To Enter A Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent
Guilty Plea

Mr. Grant alleged that his mental health issues made him incompetent to enter a
guilty plea. (R., pp.5, 56-57.) In post-conviction actions, the applicant must "present
admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was
incompetent at the time he entered his plea" in order to succeed on a claim of
incompetence.

Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 678 (2009).

To demonstrate

incompetence, an applicant must show that he lacked "the capacity to [(1)] understand
26

the

proceedings against him and

(2)

assist in

his defense.'"

Id.

(quoting

State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833,842 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960))).

Mr. Grant alleged that he was incompetent due to his mental health issues. (R., pp.5,
56-57.)

He also informed the district court that various medical records from

examinations would support his allegations, but due to his incarceration, he was unable
to provide them to the district court. 22 (R., p.57.) These alleged facts demonstrate the
possibility of a valid claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As
such, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in
error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793.
As with Mr. Grant's allegations in terms of his Estrada rights (see Section I(C)(1),
supra), the district court attempted to justify its actions based on the form guilty plea

questionnaire.

(R., p.102.)

However, as explained supra, that information, at most,

established a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.

It does

not demonstrate that Mr. Grant had failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a
valid claim, and therefore, he should have been appointed counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho
at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793.
Therefore, since the facts Mr. Grant alleged, which show the possibility of
multiple viable post-conviction claims, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant the
assistance of post-conviction counsel was erroneous.

Swader, 143 Idaho at 654;

Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. Whether as a result of his constitutional rights to due

As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, such offers of proof could be considered to
corroborate the applicant's statements if they spoke to the applicant's incompetency
during the relevant period of time (the change of plea hearing). Ridgley, 148 Idaho at
678. It is also one of the reasons that the United States Suprmee Court has identified
as revealing why such petitioners "likely need" the assistance of post-conviction
counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct at 1317.
22
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process or pursuant to the governing state statute, Mr. Grant was entitled to the
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, this Court should vacate the district
court's order denying the appointment of counsel, as well as the order summarily
dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings with the
assistance of counsel.

II.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For PostConviction Relief Without Properly Considering The Undisputed Factual Allegations He
Made In His Verified Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition

A.

Introduction
In addition to its failure to provide post-conviction counsel when it was merited,

the district court also applied the wrong laws and standards when it summarily
dismissed Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief. In a continuing theme, it did not
recognize that the statements of fact set forth in Mr. Grant's verified statement and
pleadings, as well as the attached affidavit in support of his petition, constituted
evidence it needed to consider when determining whether Mr. Grant had pled a genuine
issues of material fact. It also failed to realize that when these statements of fact went
unrefuted by the State (which apparently never filed an answer in this case), it had to
accept those statements of fact as true for purposes of summary disposition.
Additionally, those facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom had to be construed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party (i.e., Mr. Grant). A proper application
of these standards also shows that Mr. Grant presented several genuine issues of
material fact which, if true, would entitle him to relief. As such, summary dismissal was
improper and this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
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B.

The District Court Failed To Apply The Proper Standards Or Recognize What
Evidence It Could Consider, And So Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Grant's
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
As a preliminary matter, the district court committed reversible error by failing to

recognize the evidence available for its consideration (the facts Mr. Grant himself
alleged to be true) or giving that evidence its proper weight (presumed true, as they
were undisputed). See Mata, 124 Idaho at 593; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153
(2008).

As such, its determinations on all the specific issues are tainted beyond

reconciliation and this Court should remand this case for a proper determination under
the proper standards.

See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007)

(hereinafter, Charboneau II). The district court consistently failed to act in accordance

with these standards. This is true despite the fact that, while previewing its discussion
of each of Mr. Grant's claims, it recognized that it need not accept applicant's
allegations unsupported by admissible evidence. (R., p.31 (quoting Goodwin v. State,
138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2003».

However, it also needed to realize that

Mr. Grant's verified allegations constituted admissible evidence.
593.

Mata, 124 Idaho at

Therefore, its constant assertions that there was no admissible evidence

supporting Mr. Grant's claims demonstrates error, affecting the whole process. (See,
e.g., R., pp.31, 37, 38, 39,41,43,44,46,47,48,86,90,92,95,96,98,100,101,102,

103, 104, 105, 106.)
In terms of summary dismissal in post-conviction actions, the Idaho Supreme
Court has clarified that only "[w]hen the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle
the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without an evidentiary
hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. Therefore, if the alleged facts, if assumed
to be true, would support the claim, summary dismissal is inappropriate.
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Id.

And

among the facts that the district court may consider, according to the Idaho Supreme
Court, are verified facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant set forth in
"affidavits, records or other evidence." Id.; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. According to the
Court of Appeals, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the
personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is
accorded the same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such,
the allegations in the verified filings alone can provide evidence "sufficient to raise a
factual issue requiring an evidentiary hearing."

Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.

Thus, the verified pleadings alone can provide the prima facie showing to overcome
summary dismissal. Id.
Nevertheless, the district court failed to apply those rules and held that most of
Mr. Grant's allegations were not supported by such evidence, regardless of the fact that
they were set forth in verified pleadings and affidavits, but determined rather that his
allegations were bare. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 38, 39,41,43,44,46,47,86,90,91,92,
95,96,98, 101, 102, 103,104, 105, 106.) The fact that they were bare does not mean
that the district court was free to ignore them - the question it had to consider was
whether those allegations, bare though they may have been, if presumed to be true,23
would entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho

23 To presume a claim to be true means that it is considered to be accurate, even if
other evidence might suggest otherwise. Where, as here, the district court summarily
dismisses a claim because of potentially contradictory evidence, it has erroneously
applied the presumption of accuracy to the other evidence, not to the claim.
Practically speaking, all the potentially contradictory evidence does in the face of
an appropriately-applied presumption is create a genuine issue of material fact. If a
genuine issue of material fact exists, an evidentiary hearing is a necessity. See, e.g.,
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 157. Therefore, when the presumption is accurately applied, the
district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition.

30

at 153. Mr. Grant's allegations met that standard, and so he should have been afforded
an evidentiary hearing.
For example, in regard to Mr. Grant's claim regarding his Estrada rights, the
district court stated:

"However, Mr. Grant has presented no admissible evidence to

demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights to his
participation in the psychological examination. Instead the Petitioner has only set forth
unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which provide no relief under the Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act."

(R., p.98 (emphasis added).)

This reasoning is clearly

erroneous because Mr. Grant alleged in his pleadings that his attorney did not advise
him about his Estrada rights. (R., pp.3, 6.) Those petitions and affidavits were verified.
(R., pp.7, 60.)

As such, those allegations constituted admissible, verified evidence

supporting his claim for relief. Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. Furthermore, the district court's
decision to summarily dismiss because "Mr. Grant has presented no admissible
evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights
prior to his participation in the psychological examination," and because "the Petitioner
has set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no relief under
the Uniform Post Conviction Act" (R., p.98), is directly contrary to established precedent,
which provides that the verified petitions alone may be the basis for relief under the
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. 24 Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin,
145 Idaho at 153; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. The only evidence, presented in a verified

24 The undue limitation of information that may be properly considered (i.e., the district
court's refusal to consider the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified filings because they
were just his assertions) constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court.
ef. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (2008). As the district court has unduly
limited its consideration of the evidence before it, it has abused its discretion in this
manner, further justifying remanding this case for further proceedings. See id.
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petition, was that Mr. Grant's attorney failed to advise Mr. Grant of his Estrada rights.
Estrada makes it clear that, if true, that claim would entitle Mr. Grant to relief.

Therefore, presuming the claim to be true (particularly as it was unrebutted by the
State), the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. Charboneau II, 144
Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
As another example, the district court stated that "Mr. Grant also submitted the
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include any
additional documents or affidavits."

(R, p.86.)

This is another clearly erroneous

determination, since the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss
was verified by a notary public.

(R, p.60.) As such, it was essentially an affidavit.

Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. Critically, this assertion by the district court came before it

began discussing any of Mr. Grant's individual claims, which indicates that the
erroneous rationale was applied to all the ensuing subsections. As a result of numerous
misapplications of the Mata standard, both generally and to specific claims, the district
court's errors significantly undermined the entire process. Therefore, this case should
be remanded for a proper determination in regard to summary disposition.
However, the district court's failure to apply established precedential standards
did not stop there. Even when it did accept the evidence Mr. Grant presented, it did not
give it the appropriate weight. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153 (recognizing that if the
allegations are unrefuted, they must be accepted as true for purposes of summary
disposition). The State did not file an answer in this case. (See generally R) As such,
Mr. Grant's allegations were never refuted. Therefore, at least for purposes of summary
disposition, Mr. Grant's factual allegations had to be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145
Idaho at 153.

Furthermore, in summary disposition proceedings, those facts and all
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reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party.25
Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903. Rather than apply these standards, the district court

made impermissible determinations that the evidence was insufficient or that Mr. Grant
had failed to prove the allegation. (See, e.g., R., pp.39, 40, 41, 48, 98, 100, 104) At the
summary judgment phase, a petitioner is not required to prove his claim; rather, the
petitioner is required to show a potential claim that, if he can prove it at an evidentiary
hearing,26 would entitle him to relief. Charboneau fI, 144 Idaho at 903. If Mr. Grant's
uncontested allegations are properly accepted as true, then Mr. Grant has sufficiently
proved his allegations so as to merit an evidentiary hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at
153; Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.

Again, by not following this precedent, the

district court erred in such a way as to undermine the entire process. Therefore, this
case should be remanded for a proper determination in regard to summary judgment.
If Mata, Baldwin, Charboneau II, and Strickland are properly applied in this case,
it is clear that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine
issues of material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims. Those genuine issues
of material fact require an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck- Teel v. State, 143
Idaho 664, 667-68 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, the failure to comply with those standards

25 In this case, summary dismissal proceedings were initiated by the district court, sua
sponte, as the State did not file a motion for summary dismissal. (See generally, R.) As
such, the party to be favored would be Mr. Grant, as he was the only party who would
be adversely affected by the summary dismissal. See Charboneau fI, 144 Idaho at 903.
26 If the petitioner is required to prove his claim in his initial pleadings, then there is
never a reason to hold an evidentiary hearing, a result which would have serious due
process implications as doing away with evidentiary hearings altogether would likely
deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not to mention, run afoul
of the statutory procedure governing post-conviction, which provides for a hearing when
the petitioner establishes a genuine issue of material fact. I.e. §§ 19-4906(b) & -4907.
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alone demonstrates the need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand the
case for an evidentiary hearing.

C.

The District Court Failed To Apply The Appropriate Laws And Standards When It
Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
In order to avoid summary dismissal, the defendant need only demonstrate that a

genuine issue of material fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906(c); Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at
903.

In making such determinations, the district court is to construe the facts and

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at
903. In order to establish a genuine issue of material fact in regard to an ineffective
assistance claim, the applicant need only present facts which would demonstrate that
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e., prejudiced him). Strickland,
466 U.S at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, where the applicant has set forth
verified facts which the district court may consider, and indeed must accept as true if
they are unrefuted, which establish that his attorney's performance was objectively
unreasonable and prejudiced him, summary judgment was inappropriate.
In addition to its failure to properly consider the verified petitions, discussed
supra, the district court also misinterpreted the prejudice prong of Strickland.

To

demonstrate prejudice, the applicant need only demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
However, the district court required that Mr. Grant demonstrate that the outcome "WOUld
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have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors.,,27 (See, e.g., R., pp.47;

see also R., pp.95, 96, 106.)

The district court's requirement that Mr. Grant

demonstrate that the outcome would have been different places a far more onerous
burden on him than the one actually levied by the law:

under the district court's

standard, Mr. Grant would have to have proven there was no alternative but a different,
favorable outcome, whereas Strickland only requires the applicant to demonstrate the
possibility that a different outcome may have resulted. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; cf.
Day, _

P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (Ct. App. January 24, 2013) (discussing a

similar standard regarding prejudice in terms of fundamental error, "[that standard] does
not require Day to make such an affirmative showing.

Rather, as Day asserts, [it]

requires that Day must demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial") (emphasis in original).

Therefore, to meet that

burden, Mr. Grant needed only to undermine confidence in the outcome (i.e., make it
less certain as the result), not affirmatively prove an alternative outcome would have
come to pass. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
If Mata, Baldwin, Charboneau II, and Strickland are properly applied in this case,
it is clear that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine
issues of material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims.28 Those genuine issues

27 To this same end, the district court was requiring Mr. Grant to prove his allegations by
a preponderance of the evidence. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 39) That burden is premature
since demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result establishes the
genuine issue of material fact justifying a hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. It is
at that subsequent evidentiary hearing that he is required to prove his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 121 Idaho 257, 258
(Ct. App. 1992) ("In a post-conviction relief hearing, the petitioner has the burden of
proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the evidence."
~emphasis added)).
8 In wrapping up its discussion of the individual claims, the district court stated "the
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling argument
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of material fact require an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck- Teel, 143 Idaho
at 667-68. As such, the failure to comply with those standards alone demonstrates the
need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand the case for an evidentiary
hearing.

D.

In Regard To Several Of Mr. Grant's Specific Allegations, He Alleged Facts
Which, If True! Would Entitle Him To Post-Conviction Relief! And Thus! Summary
Dismissal Of His Claims Was In Error
As discussed in Section I(C), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts demonstrating the

possibility of several valid claims. In regard to some of them, his pro se pleadings also
alleged sufficient facts that, at least, demonstrate genuine issues of material fact, which
should have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing on those issues.

However, on

others, the record does not contain sufficient facts to make that assertion, usually
because the prejudice caused by trial counsel's errors, while implied, was not actually
articulated. 29 However, they should remain viable issues on remand, since presumably!

that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorney's errors."
(R., p.106.) This statement imputes the erroneous standard to all of Mr. Grant's claims.
In addition, the district court's additional requirement of a "compelling argument" is also
erroneous at the summary judgment proceedings, as Mr. Grant need only demonstrate
that, if true, his factual allegations would support his claims. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
The determination of whether the argument is compelling (i.e., proven to a sufficiency of
the evidence) is one appropriately left until after the evidentiary hearing, after Mr. Grant
has had the full opportunity to make a compelling argument based on all the evidence,
for which he needed the assistance of counsel. See Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.
As such, this is yet another clear demonstration of the district court's erroneous actions
in this case.
29 Issues in this situation include, but are not limited to, Mr. Grant's claim that his
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his Estrada rights (see Section
I(C)(1), supra), Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for not reviewing the
PSI with him or assisting him to object to erroneous or unreliable information therein
(see Section I(C)(2), supra), Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for not
presenting certain, articulated, mitigating evidence (see Section I(C)(3), supra), and
Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a change of
venue or recusal of the district court judge (see Section I(C)(4), supra).
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given the assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant to could file an amended petition articulating
that prejudice and presenting genuine issues of material fact in regard to those claims.
However, as there are some issues in which Mr. Grant did allege, at least,
genuine issues of material fact, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the
petition was erroneous and should be reversed.

1.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of
His Right To Remain Silent During The Presentence Investigations, Per
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada

As explained in Section I(C)(1), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient, failing
to inform him of his right to remain silent during the psychological examinations.
(R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information obtained during this interview

was used against him at his sentencing hearing. (R., p.54.) As such, those verified
facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's
favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial on that claim
was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

See

Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903.

2.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective By Inducing Him To Plead
Guilty Based On False Assurances Regarding His Potential Sentence

As explained in Section I(C)(5), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney provided deficient representation by
inducing him to plead guilty based on false assurances as to the potential overall length
of his sentence and his initial participation in the rider program. (R., p.57.) As such, this
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robbed his guilty plea of the necessary voluntariness. See Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884.
He also alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficient
performance, as he asserted in his verified response to the notice of intent to dismiss
that there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.
(R., p.58.) Since Mr. Grant need only undermine confidence in the outcome (in this

case, the decision to plead guilty) to show prejudice, that verified allegation is sufficient
to meet the requirement from Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such,
those verified facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in
Mr. Grant's favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial
on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
See Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903.

3.

Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him
To Relief Because His Guilty Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And
Voluntarily Entered

As explained in Section I(C)(6), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
enter his guilty plea based on the fact that he was suffering a severe depressive
episode associated with his mental health conditions. As such, those verified facts and
reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's favor,
would entitle him to relief.

See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 678.

Therefore, summary

dismissal on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing. See Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903.
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CONCLUSION
Because the district court erroneously denied his request for the assistance of
post-conviction counsel, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
denying him the assistance of counsel, as well as the order summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Additionally,

because the district court erroneously summarily dismissed those claims,

he

respectfully requests this Court instruct that an evidentiary hearing be among those
future proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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hospital emergency room for treatment. Later in the day at
approximately 3:30 p.m., the police went to a motel on a
report of a hit and mn involving a motorcycle and discovered
Johnson's motorcycle with blood on it, the license plate
removed, and a bloody shil1 in the motel lobby. Two days
later, Johnson turned himself in to the police and was treated
for injuries to his left hand.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Corey L. JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.

COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
NO.2002-CA-000384-MR.

March 28, 2003.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Indictment Nos. 99CR-001999 and 99-CR-002220; Ann O'Malley Shake, Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms

On August 17, 1999, a grand jury indicted Johnson in Case
No. 99-CR-001999 for assault in the first degree (Assault
I), I escape in the first degree (Escape I), 2 resisting arrest, 3
and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree
(PFO II) .4 On September 13, 1999, another grand jury
returned a second indictment in Case No. 99-CR-002220
charging Johnson with assault in the third degree (Assault
III) 5 and tampering with physical evidence 6 involving the
same incident with Deputy Hutchison. The two indictments
were consolidated for fmiher proceedings.

Corey L. Johnson, pro se, LaGrange, KY, for appellant
On September
Albert B. Chandler, II, Attorney General, Louis F.
k, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfol1, KY, for appellee.

2000, Johnson entered a guilty plea

pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford 7 and a plea agreement
with the Commonwealth to an amended charge of assault in

Before HUDDLESTON, PAISLEY and TACKETT, Judges.

the second degree (Assault II), 8 Escape I, Resisting Arrest,
Tampering with Physical Evidence, and PFO II. Under the

Opinion

plea agreement the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the
count of Assault III and recommended sentences often years
on both the Assault II and Escape I offenses enhanced to
thirteen years for being a PFO II, five years for Tampering
with Physical Evidence enhanced to ten years for being a
PFO II, and twelve months for Resisting Arrest, all to run

OPINION
HUDDLESTON, Judge.
*1 Corey L. Johnson appeals from a Jefferson Circuit
Court opinion and order which denied his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set
aside or correct his thil1een-year sentence for assault, escape,
resisting arrest, tampering with physical evidence and being
a persistent felony offender.
On the moming of August 14, 1999, at approximately 4:27
a.m., Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff William Hutchison
stopped Johnson on Interstate 65 allegedly for speeding
and recklessly driving his motorcycle at approximately 110
m.p.h. During the encounter, a struggle ensued after Deputy
Hutchison allegedly put one handcuff on Johnson while
placing him under arrest. In the struggle, Johnson hit Deputy
Hutchison in the face several times causing injuries to his
face including several lacerations, bruising, swelling and a
fractured nose. Johnson left the scene on his motorcycle,
and Deputy Hutchison was taken semi-conscious to the

concurrently for a total sentence of thirteen years. 9 Johnson
waived preparation of a presentence investigation report and
the cifcuit court immediately sentenced him to serve thirteen
years consistent with the Commonwealth's recommendation.
On May 1, 2001, Johnson filed a pro se motion to vacate
pursuant to RCf 11.42 based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, lack of evidence and double jeopardy. He also
filed associated motions for an evidentiary hearing and
appointment of counseL On May 7, 2001, the circuit court
granted the motion to appoint counseL On October 18, 200 I,
counsel filed a supplement to the RCr 11.42 motion alleging
ineffective assistance for counsel's failure adequately to
advise Johnson of a possible extreme emotional disturbance
defense. On February 2, 2002, the circuit court rendered an
opinion and signed an order denying the motion without a
hearing stating that the guilty plea colloquy established that

Johnson had not been nn'l11,rl""'Pri by counsel's representation,
This appeal followed,
'k2 Johnson raises numerous issues involving his guilty
plea, most of which are based on a charge of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In order to establish ineffective
assistance of
a person must satisfy a two-part test
showing both that counsel's performance was deficient and
that the deficiency resulted in actual prejudice resulting

in a proceeding that was ilmdamentally unfair. 10 Where
an appellant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective
counsel, he must show both that counsel made serious
errors outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance II and that the deficient performance so seriously
affected the outcome of the plea proccss that, but for the
errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have pled guilty, but rather would have
insisted on going to trial. 12 The burden is on the defendant
to overcome a strong presumption that counsel's assistance
was constitutionally sufficient. 13 A court must be highly
deferential in reviewing defense counsei's perfom1ance aud
should avoid second'"guessing counsel's actions based on
hindsight 14 Both the perfonnance and prejudice prongs
of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard are mixed
questions of law and [:let 15 While the trial court's factual
findings pertaining to detennining ineffective assistance of
counsel are subject to review only for clear error, the ultimate
decision on the existence of deficient performance and actual
prejudice is subject to de novo review on appeaL

16

RCr II A2 provides persons in custody under sentence a
procedure for raising collateral challenges to a judgment
of conviction entered against them, A movant is not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
motion, 17 However, an evidentiary hearing is required on an
RCr 11 A2 motion where the issues raised in the motion are
not refuted on the record, or where the allegations, even if
true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction. 18
"A judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the
absence of evidence in the record refuting them," 19
Johnson attacks his escape conviction on numerous grounds,
First, he alleges that his plea to this offense was based on
his understanding that he was pleading guilty to escape in
the second degree,20 not escape in the first degree, While
in one instance during the guilty plea hearing the trial judge
did mistakenly refer to the charge as escape in the second

in all other instances, which were numerous, he
referred to it as escape in the first degree, Also, the
Commonwealth's Offer on a Plea of Guilty document signed
Johnson clearly lists the offense as Escape L Johnson's
claim that he thought he was pleading guilty to escape in
the second
is unreasonable and clearly refuted by the
record,
('m~pr·tlv

Johnson asserts that counsel was ineffective for not
him that certain evidence concerning the events
of the incident was inadmissible hearsay and failing
to move to suppress such evidence prior to triaL This
issue is based on Johnson's misunderstanding of legal
procedure. The offensive so~called "hearsay evidence" is
Johnson's characterization of "testimony" by Detective
Jeffrey Whobrey, who investigated the case, Johnson states
that counsel should have moved to suppress "testimony"
by Detective Whobrey concerning statements made to
him by Deputy Hutchison and other witnesses because
the statements were inadmissible investigative hearsay, He
further concludes that without Detective Whobrey's alleged
testimony, the Commonwealth would have been
unable to prove an element of escape, that being he was in
custody prior to fleeing the scene.
*3 This argument apparently is derived tJ'om statements
made by the prosecutor at the guilty plea hearing during which
he stated that the prosecution would present evidence that
Johnson stmck Deputy Hutchison just after the deputy had
placed one of the two handcuffs on Johnson while making
an arrest. The prosecutor also stated that Detective Whobrey
would testifY for the Commonwealth at triaL The prosecutor
did not state that Detective Whobrey's testimony would be
based on hearsay statements. The prosecutor mentioned that
Detective Whobrey would testify that Deputy Hutchison's
handcuffs were never recovered, Moreover, the prosecutor
said Deputy Hutchison would testify that Johnson attacked
him while he was arresting him. In conclusion, there was
sufficient evidence other than any hearsay statements made
to Detective Whobrey to support the escape charge and
Johnson has not established that the detective would have
even attempted to testifY at trial as to hearsay statements made
to him. Consequently, defense counsel was not deficient in
failing to move to suppress any alleged hearsay statements to
Detective Whobrey prior to trial or not advising Johnson that
such statements were inadmissible,
Johnson also contends that defense counsel was ineffective
for allowing him to plead guilty to tampering with physical

evidence because the indictment with respect to that offense
had been
infonnally amended. He states that
the indictment was originally based on his having fled the
scene on his
which had blood on it, but that the
prosecutor stated at the guilty plea hearing that he would seek
a conviction based on Johnson's removal from the scene of
his blood-stained shirt and Deputy Hutchison's handcuffs. 21
This argument is without merit.
there is nothing in the record to support Johnson's
assertion that the indictment was based solely on the removal
of the motorcycle. The indictment charged Johnson with:
Tampering with Physical Evidence
when, believing that an official
proceeding may be pending or
instituted against him, he destroyed,
mutilated, concealed, removed or
altered the physical evidence which
he believed was about to be produced
or llsed in such official procecding,
with the intent to impair its veracity or
availability in an official proceeding,
The indictment did not limit or restrict this count to the
motorcycle. Even so, the prosecution notified the defense
shortly aftcr auaignment through discovery of its intent to
offer evidence on the handcuffs and bloody shirt at trial. An
indictment may be amended at any time to conform to the
proof at trial provided that no additional or different offense
is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are
not prejudiced by undue surprise. 22 The Commonwealth
obtained an order from the court requiring Johnson to
provide a blood sample for, inter alia, comparison with the
bloodstains on the shirt recovered from the moteL Johnson did
not deny having fought with and injuring Deputy Hutchison,
but rather raised a justification defense. As a result,
utilization of evidence concerning the handcuffs and bloody
shirt to establish the offense of tampering with physical
evidence would not have constituted an improper constructive

he received the maximum sentence on the tampering with
physical evidence
While Johnson did receive the
maximum sentence for the wU'W'~'H'K with physical evidence
he received less than the maximum sentence on the
Assault II and Escape I offenses, which carried sentence
up to twenty years as enhanced by the PFO II offense.
Moreover, the sentences for all the offenses involving Deputy
Hutchison were run concurrently, rather than consecutively,
so Johnson did not receive the maximum sentence. Even
assuming counsel told Johnson he would receive less than
the maximum sentence on all the charges, counsel was not
deficient because this advice was not erroneous.
Johnson also attacks his guilty plea to the Assault II
offense based on his contention that counsel failed to
investigate the extent of Deputy Hutchison's injuries, failed
to advise him of the potential defense of extreme emotional
disturbance, and failed to advise him of and challenge the
indictments on double jeopardy grounds. With respect to the
officer's injuries, Johnson objects to the Commonwealth's
characterization of Deputy Hutehison's injuries as "broken
bones" in describing the evidence Juring the guilty plea
He notes that
hearing in support of the assault
the medical records refer to the deputy's nose injury as
"comminuted bone fracture." While the extent of injury is
a factor differentiating Assault I (requiring serious physical
injury) and A.ssault II (requiring physical injury), Johnson
has not shown that this issue renders his guilty plea suspect.
The Commonwealth stated that if the case had gone to
trial, it could produce testimony from a medical expert
that Deputy Hutchison's injuries constituted serious physical
injury. The record indicates that defense counsel employed
and received an opinion from a medical expert, but the
exact content of that opinion is not revealed. Nevertheless,
Deputy Hutchison clearly suffered physical injury. Deputy
Hutchison's statements and the nature of his injuries also
suggest that he was hit in the face with an instrument,
presumably the handcuffs. Given the location and extent of
the injuries, the handcuffs arguably would have constituted

amendment of the indictment. 23 Defense counsel was not
deficient for advising Johnson to plead guilty to tampering
with physical evidence based on the evidence proffered by the
Commonwealth.

a "dangerous instrument." 24 There was sufficient evidence
of the elements for Assault II. Accordingly, Johnson has not
shown counsel's performance was deficient or that he suffered
actual prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability he
would not have been convicted of Assault II at trial.

*4 Johnson challenges the guilty plea by alleging that
counsel erroneously told him that he would receive less than
the maximum sentence on all the offenses. He asserts that
counsel's faulty performance is evidenced by the fact that

Johnson asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to
inform him that he could not be convicted of both Assault I
and Assault III under the prohibition against double jeopardy.
He states counsel should have sought to dismiss one of

the assault counts on double jeopardy grounds. The double
jeopardy clause ofthe Fifth Amendment ofthe United States
Constitution states that no person shall be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jcopardy of life or limb, Section
13 ofthe Kentucky Constitution contains a similar provision,
Double jeopardy prohibits: (l) a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction; and (3) mUltiple
punishments for the same offense,25 This case implicates
the multiple punishments aspect of the double jeopardy
protection involving multiple prosecutions within the same
proceeding. In this type of situation, if double jeopardy
applies to multiple offenses, the propcr procedure is to tailor
the instmctions to require alternative findings of guilt, rather
than dismissal of a charge prior to trial. 26 The double
jeopardy clause does not preclude multiple convictions,
only judgments imposing multiple punishments. 27 Thus,
Johnson's assertion that counsel was ineffective for not
seeking dismissal of one of the assault charges prior to trial
is incorrect
*5 In addition, Johnson's claim that double jeopardy would
punishment for both Assault I and Assault II appears
to be erroneous. In Commonwealth v.
28 the Kentucky
Supreme Court adopted the "same elements" test enunciated
in Btockburger v< United States, 29 for determining when a
single act or transaction may violate two distinct statutory
provisions for purposes of double jeopardy, Under this test,
"[d]ouble jeopardy does not occur when a person is charged
with two crimes arising from the same course of conduct,
as long as each statute 'requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not.' ,,30 The Kentucky Supreme Court
has stated the Blockburger analysis is the exclusive test for
determining double jeopardy involving multiple statutes. 31
It focuses on the statutory elements and the indictment rather
than the entire conduct of the defendant 32 The Blockburger
analysis requires proof of an additional fact or element for
each offense not necessary to establish the other offense. 33
In the current case, Johnson was indicted for Assault I under
KRS 50S,OlD, which involves intentionally causing serious
physical injury to another person by mean of a deadly weapon
or a dangerous instrument, and for Assault III under KRS
50S.025(a)(1), which involves intentionally causing physical
injury to a peace officer. In addition, Assault II under KRS
50S.020(I)(b) involves intentionally causing physical injury
to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous

instmment. Applying the same elements test, intentional
of use of a deadly
Assault I or Assault IT
weapon or dangerous instmment not necessmy to establish
Assault III. Similarly, intentional Assault III requires proof
that the victim be a peace officer, which is not necessary to
prove Assault I or Assault II. Accordingly, intentional assault
of a peace officer would not constitute a lesser included
offense of either Assault I or Assault II and punishment
for Assault III and either Assault I or Assault II would not
be barred by double jeopardy, 34 Assault II was intended
to punish and prevent injurious behavior directed at law
enforcement personnel, while Assault J and Assault II require
use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instmment. The former
targets a specific type of victim and the latter target an
instmmentality. Thus, Johnson's counsel would not have been
dcficient for failing to advise him about a double jeopardy
defense,
Even if a double jeopardy defense was available, Johnson
has not shown that he sutTered actual prejudice by counsel's
failure to advise him of it Under the plea agreement, Johnson
pled guilty to the amended charge of Assault II and the
Commonwealth moved to dismiss the Assault III charge.
As stated earlier, there was sufficient evidence to submit
instmctions on Assault I, Assault II, and Assault III to the
jury, While the issue of the extent of Deputy Hutchison's
injuries was disputed, the evidence supporting Assault II was
very strong, Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability
that had he gone to trial, Johnson would have been acquitted
of Assault II and his decision whether to plead guilty would
have been different based on any double jeopardy bar.
*6 Finally, Johnson contends counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him of a possible extreme emotional
disturbance defense< In his affidavit accompanying the
supplemental RCr 11 A2 motion, Johnson alleges Deputy
Hutchison made a racial comment and suggested he could
afford such a nice motorcycle because he was a drug dealer.
He states that the officer "without warning" sprayed him with
Mace several times and then knocked him off his motorcycle.
Johnson continues:
By way of reaction to this unexpected attack and acting
solely by instinct and in fear of my personal safety and
wellbeing, I pushed Hutchinson [sic] away from me while
attempting to block any more [M]ace being shot in my
face. At this point Deputy Hutchinson [sic] plainly stated
"Oh, we got us a nigger that likes to resist arrest .n well I
got something for you bitch!' Hutchinson [sic] then stmek

affiant with a left hook thereby beginning a brief stmggle
wherein affiant was forced to protect himself from what
was obviously a dangerous and volitable [sic] situation.
if not his very life,
Affiant, acting in fear of his own
broke away from the Deputy, picked up his motorcycle and
left the scene, leaving Hutchinson [sic] still on the ground
constantly spraying [M]ace and cursing me.
Extreme emotional disturbance has been defined as "a
temporary state of mind so enraged, int1amcd, or disturbed
as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one
to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the
extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes." 35 Extreme emotional disturbance
requires provocation with a "triggering event" that is
sudden and unintemlpted,36 and involves viewing the
circumstances subjectively from the defendant's point of
view. 37 "Evidence of mere 'hurt' or 'anger' is insufficient
.
I d'18turbance. 38 ' reh
'
to prove extreme emotlOna
eXistence
af
extreme emotional disturbance serves to mitigate punishment
rather than provide total exoneration, and generally must be

proven by the defendant. 39 Under KRS 508.040( 1), extreme
emotional disturbance is available as a defense to prosecution
for an intentional assault in the first, second or fOUlih
degree, but not assault in the third degree. 40 Conviction
for assault under extreme emotional disturbance reduces the
classification and resulting range of punishment for offenses
that otherwise would constitute Assault I (Class B felony) and
Assault II (Class C felony) to one to five years commensurate
with a Class D felony" 41
In the current case, Johnson asserts that defense counsel
never advised him of the availability of an extreme emotional
disturbance defense and that he would have decided to go
to trial rather than plead guilty had he been so advised.
The circuit court denied the RCr 11.42 motion and an
evidentiary hearing primarily based on the guilty plea
colloquy in which Johnson stated that he was satisfied with
counsel's advice. While a defendant's representations at a

Boyken 42 hearing constitute a formidable barrier in any
subsequent proceeding, that barrier is not insurmountable. 43
A defendant's statements at the guilty plea hearing concerning
his relationship with counsel must be evaluated in light of
what the defendant knew or should have known and do not
necessarily preclude him from subsequently raising issues of
ineffective assistance. Representations in response to general
questions do not conclusively refute specific allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficicnt to justifY denial
of a hearing. 44 The availability of an extreme emotional
disturbance defense was not specifically discussed at the
Boyken hearing and neither Johnson's representations during
that hearing nor anything else in the rccord clearly refilte his
claim that counsel did not advise him of that defenseo
*7 The circuit court also found that Johnson failed to
establish he was prejudiced by counsel's representation, but it
did not specifically analyze his extreme emotion disturbance
claim. Instead, the court merely stated that Johnson received
a sentence less severe than he could have received had he
gone to trial. While the potential sentence facing a defendant
is relevant, it is not the sole factor and must be balanced
with other considerations relevant to a defendant's decision
whether to go to trial or plead guilty. As the court stated in

Hill v. Lockhart,45 "where he [the defendant] alleged error
of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential
affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of
the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial."
Johnson has alleged sufficient facts to support an
extreme emotional disturbance defense. Johnson and Deputy
Hutchison were the only witnesses to the incident Although
the Commonwealth indicated it would call a medical expert
and the investigative officer as witnesses at trial, the exact
content of their testimony is not revealed. The current record
contains insufficient information to evaluate the viability
of an extreme emotional disturbance defense. Additionally,
Johnson would have been subject to a maximum sentence
of ten years on a conviction for either Assault I or Assault
II under Extreme Emotional Disturbance as enhanced by the
PFO II, which is less than the thilieen years he received
under the guilty plea. As a result, we cannot say the record
clearly refutes Johnson's claim of actual prejudice provided
he was not advised or aware of an extreme emotional
disturbance defense. Consequently, an evidentiary hearing
is necessary to provide further information on counsel's
performance, i.e., whether he discussed a potential extreme
emotional disturbance defense with Johnson and counsel's
handling of this issue, and any actual prejudice should defense
counsel's performance be deemed deficient. The circuit
court's order denying Johnson's RCr 11.42 motion must be
vacated with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel conceming a potential extreme emotional disturbance
defense, and this case must be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on and reconsideration by the eourt of that issue.

The order denying Johnson' RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed in
part and vacated in part, and this case is remanded to Jefferson
Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opmion,

ALL CONCUR.

Footnotes

1

Ky,Rev.Stat (KRS) 508.010 (Class B felony).

2

KRS 532.020 (Class C felony),

3

KRS 520.090 (Class A misdemeanor),

4

KRS 532.080.

5

KRS 508.025 (Class D felony),

6

KRS 524.100 (Class D felony).

7

400 U.S. 25, 91 s.n 160,27 L.Ed2d 162 (1970). A defendant pleading guilty under Alford declines to admit his guilt but
acknowledges that the Commonwealth can present sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
KRS 508.020 (Class C felony).

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

As part of the plea agreement, Johnson also plead guilty to an unrelated offense of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or
deceit in Case No. OO-CR-OO 1313 with a recommended sentence by the Commonwealth of one year to be served consecutively to
the thirteen year sentence under Case No, 99-CR-00 1999 and No, 99-CR-002220 for a total sentenee of fourteen years.
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 SD. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S .W,2d
37 (1985); Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W3d 878, 884 (2000).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U,S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449,25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky.App" 5]
S.W.3d 456, 459 (2000),
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 360, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Russell v, Commonwealth, Ky.App., 992 S.W .2d
871 (l999).
Strickland, supra, n. 10,466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Pel/i'ey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460,463 (1999).
Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S,W.2d at 3! 1,315 (1998); Russell, supra, n. 12,992 S.W.2d at 875.
Strickland, supra, no. 10, 466 U.s. at 698, 104 S. CL at 2070; Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir.1997).
See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310-1311 (6th Cir.l996); Groseclose, td., 130 F3d. at 1164.

17

Harper, supra, n. 14,978 S. W.2d at 3]4; Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 904 (1998).

18
19
20
21

Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001); Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (2001).

22
23

24
25
26
27

Fraser, id., 59 S.W.3d at 453.

KRS 520.030.
Johnson implies that removal of the motorcycle no longer provided evidentiary support for the tampering charge because test results
allegedly indicated only his blood was on it. The record does not contain the test results or the reason why the prosecution did not
mention the motorcycle at the hearing.
See Schambon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 804,809-10 (1991); Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 135,140-41
(2001); RCr 6.16. See also United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 756-59 (6th Cir.2000) (discussing difference between amendment,
constructive amendment, and variance with indictment).
See, e.g., Washington v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 6 S.W.3d 384 (1999) (harmless error analysis applies to amendment of indictment);
cf Wolfrecht v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 533 (1997) (amendment to indictment changing named principals in murder from
defendants to unknown persons held to be illegal).
A dangerous instrument is any instrument, including parts of the human body when a serious physical injury is a direct result ofthe
use of that part of the human body, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, ... is readily capable of
causing death or serious physical injury. KRS 500.080(3).
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 271-74, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2139-40, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); Hourigan v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
962 S.W.2d 860,862 (1998).
See Commonwealth v. Black, Ky., 907 S.W.2d 762 (1995).
See Carter v. Commonwealth Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1989); Walden v. Commonwealth. Ky., 805 S.W.2d 102, 106-07 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1996), cert. denied sub. nom., Effinger v. Kentuck
y, 522 U.S. 971, 118 S.Ct. 422, 139 L.Ed.2d 323 (1997).

28

Supra, n. 27.

29

284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180,76 L.Ed.2d 306 (1932).

30

Burge, supra, n. 27, 947 S.W.2d at 811 (quoting Btockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. J80, 182, 76 L.Ed.2d

31

306 (1932».
See Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1999); Barth v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 390,399 (2001). But see
also KRS 505.020 (codifying Btockburger analysis).

32

33
34

35
36

37
38
39

ld.
Burge, supra, n. 27,947 S.W.2d at 809.
See, e.g., State v. Dunbar, 37 Conn.App. 338,656 A.2d 672 (1995). We note that Assault III can also be established by proof the
with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument caused physical injury to a peace officer. KRS 508.025(a)(l).
defendant
Double jeopardy would bar punishment under this prong of the offense and either Assault r or Assault II because it does not require
proof of a fact not contained in the latter offenses. See also KRS 505.020(2)(d) (extent of injury not differentiating element).
lYfcClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S. W.2d 464, 468 69 (1986). See also Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811, 8 J 5
(1991), overruled on other grounds by Elliott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416 (1998).
Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (1999); Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670 (1991); Baze v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817,823 (1997).
0pears v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 152, 155 (2000); Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 355,358 (2001); Gall v..
Commonwealth, Ky., 607 S.W.2d 97, 108 (1980); KRS 507.020(l)(a).
Talbott v. Commonwealth, Ky. 968 S.W.2d 76, 85 (1998) (citing Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871 (1993».
See Engler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 627 S.W.2d 582, 583 (1982).

40
41
42

Boyken v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.C!. 1709,23 LEd.2d 224 (1969).

43
44

See, e.g., Fraser, supra; il-1yers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S .W.3d 594 (2001)(hearing ordered on allegation attorney advised him

45

that sentence under plea agreement was illegal and would be reduced at a later date).
474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 371.

See also Wyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 832 (1987).

KRS 508.040(2)(a).
Fraser, supra, n. 18,59 S.W.3d at 457.

u

